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The Current Generation of Constitutional Law
REVIEW OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, BY MARK TUSHNET. PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2003. 265 PAGES.
DAVID FONTANA*
INTRODUCTION
In 1969, Kevin Phillips published a landmark book on the Republican Party,
predicting an “emerging Republican majority.”1 This majority has at least partly
dominated the national political landscape since 1980. Since that year, Republi-
cans have won five out of seven presidential elections, and have controlled the
White House for sixteen out of twenty-four years. Republicans have nominated
five of the last seven Justices to the Supreme Court, and seven of the nine
Justices sitting on the Court now. Republicans have controlled both Houses of
Congress for the past ten years, except for the 18-month period after Senator
Jim Jeffords (Vt.) left the party, throwing control of the Senate to the Demo-
crats.2 With the election of George W. Bush to a second term in November of
2004 and the consolidation of Republican control over both Houses of Con-
gress, this emerging majority has taken a solid grasp of the American political
landscape. With this success at the ballot box, has there been a Republican legal
and political revolution?
Mark Tushnet says there has not been such a revolution, but instead a
freezing in place of the 1980 status quo.3 Tushnet calls this new state of affairs
the “chastened” constitutional order.4 In this new, chastened constitutional
order, political parties are increasingly internally united, creating two starkly
different visions of America. With two ideologically distinct political parties,
major initiatives are difficult to pass. As Tushnet describes it, the “guiding
principle of the new regime is not that government cannot solve problems, but
* J.D., Yale University; D.Phil., expected, Oxford University; B.A., University of Virginia. Law
Clerk designate, 2005-06, Judge Dorothy W. Nelson, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. My thanks to the following individuals for helpful comments: Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Reed
Amar, Stephen Galoob, Adam Hickey, Nickolai Levin, Matthew Lindsay, Gerard Magliocca, Jeffrey
Manns, Robert Post, Peter Schuck, Micah Schwartzman, Christopher Slobogin, Matthew Spence, Kate
Stith, and Howard Wasserman.
1. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969).
2. Republicans became the majority party in the Senate in 1995. After the election of 2000 left the
Senate with a 50-50 split, the Democrats were the nominal majority from Jan. 3 to Jan. 20, 2001, with
Vice President Gore as tiebreaker. When Vice President Cheney took office, the Republicans became
the majority, until Senator Jeffords of Vermont left the party in June 2001 and caucused with the
Democrats; from June 2001 to November 2003 the Democrats had a 50-49-1 advantage. The 2002
election again resulted in a Republican majority. See http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/
one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm.
3. MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003).
4. Id., passim.
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that it cannot solve any more problems.”5 In his review of Tushnet’s book in
this Issue, Steven Calabresi argues that Tushnet, following Bruce Ackerman, is
wrong to focus on a finite number of constitutional orders.6 Calabresi argues
that if one had to focus on the current political and legal landscape, it could
more accurately be described as “libertarian-lite.” Given Tushnet’s background
as one of America’s leading constitutional theorists,7 and a scholar who has
written on a variety of topics, from comparative constitutional law8 to critical
legal studies9 to the NAACP,10 his arguments are profoundly important. His
book is probably the single best comprehensive examination of the Rehnquist
5. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and
the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 63 n.156 (1999) (thanking Mark
Graber for this verbal formulation of the new regime). This article was the primary foundation for the
book, which is a heavily revised and edited compilation of a series of earlier articles by Tushnet. See
Mark Tushnet, Federalism and International Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order, 47 WAYNE
L. REV. 841 (2001); Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J.
11 (2000); Mark Tushnet, Mr. Jones and the Supreme Court, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 173 (2001); Mark
Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71 (2001); Mark Tushnet, What is
the Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 25 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 927 (2000). See also TUSHNET, supra
note 3, at x (citing these articles as the basis for his book).
6. Steven Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist Court, 93 GEO.
L.J. 1023 (2005) (“Tushnet agrees with the position . . . that not all constitutional moments happen
quickly”). Calabresi argues that Ackerman argues that there have been only three key constitutional
moments. Id. (noting “Bruce Ackerman’s claim that there has not been a constitutional moment since
1937”); id. at 1026 (“I . . . challenge the whole concept of enduring constitutional orders that last for
eighty years, in the case of the Founding Republic, seventy years in the case of the Middle Republic,
and sixty-five years in the case of the New Deal Era”); id. at 1028 (stating that Ackerman argues that
major constitutional changes “occur[] every sixty to eighty years when the voters pay a lot more
attention to constitutional issues and when they make major settlements, in extra-legal ways, of major,
outstanding constitutional issues”). Of course, one of the appeals of Tushnet’s book is its portrait of a
gradually emerging series of constitutional changes, TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 2 (“Constitutional orders
are gradually constructed and transformed”), and although Ackerman focuses on three major constitu-
tional periods, that does not mean he believes there are not major, quasi-constitutional moments that
occur in between the major transformations. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, AMERICA ON THE BRINK
(forthcoming 2005); Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the
Presidency, 90 VA. L. REV. 551 (2004). One does not need a constitutional moment, according to
Ackerman’s theory, for there to be major constitutional changes.
7. Tushnet is ranked seventh (tied with Bruce Ackerman) on Brian Leiter’s list of the most cited
legal scholars. http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings02/most_cited.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2005).
8. See, e.g., VICKI JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999); Mark
Tushnet, Non-Judicial Review, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 453 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and
Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 245 (1995); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225 (1999); Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some Compara-
tive Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 435 (2002).
9. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1988); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
10. MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936–1961 (1994); MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991 (1997); MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987).
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Court, as Calabresi agrees.11
This Review discusses Tushnet’s assessment of the constitutional order that
he argues has prevailed since 1980. Tushnet aspires to describe the full and
complete constitutional order—“a reasonably stable set of institutions through
which a nation’s fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period.”12
Given this stated aspiration, Tushnet’s book would have been even more
compelling if it included a closer examination of the actual activities of the
other branches of government.
A closer examination of the politics and policies of the last generation
demonstrates an important central dynamic—the increasingly conservative na-
ture of American political discourse and American political parties. Tushnet
argues that the Democratic Party has moved sharply to the left, and the
Republican Party has moved sharply to the right. Therefore, according to
Tushnet, these parties meet in the middle, and meet infrequently there because
they are so separated ideologically. I disagree. A review of some of the available
evidence about the legislation of the past generation and the political attitudes
of citizens and parties indicates that political discourse has moved sharply to the
right, so no matter where the parties meet, they are meeting at a point far to the
right of where they did in the “old” constitutional order. There are exceptions to
this general trend, and there are competing versions of conservatism, but the
overall shift is real, and complicates both Tushnet’s picture of a chastened
constitutional order and Calabresi’s picture of a libertarian-lite constitutional
order.
Part I of this Review will discuss Tushnet’s comprehensive description of the
structural characteristics of the new constitutional order, as well as the substan-
tive components of this regime. Part II discusses what Tushnet’s efforts might
have gained from closer examination of the activities of other branches of
government, and Part III considers how such an examination might result in a
partial reformulation of some of the institutional and substantive components of
the regime of the past generation.
I. THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER ACCORDING TO TUSHNET
Seemingly every discipline in the social sciences has its own sub-field
specializing in sweeping characterizations of particular generations or moments.
In sociology, Daniel Bell’s landmark The End of Ideology,13 written before the
tumultuous years of the 1960s, described the general social tenor of the 1950s.
Political scientists debate realigning elections, elections that result in a general
11. Steven G. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1025 (“Mark Tushnet’s The New Constitutional Order is
one of the best books about constitutional theory I have read in a long time.”).
12. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added).
13. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1965).
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political dynamic that rules American politics for a period of thirty-six years.14
Tushnet’s definition of a constitutional order does for constitutional law what
these other approaches to scholarship have done for their respective fields. A
constitutional order is the order of a particular age or period of time, the
defining constitutional ethos or zeitgeist of that age. Tushnet defines a constitu-
tional order as:
[A] reasonably stable set of institutions through which a nation’s fundamental
decisions are made over a sustained period, and the principles that guide those
decisions. These institutions and principles provide the structure within which
ordinary political convention occurs, which is why I call them constitutional
rather than merely political.15
Constitutional scholars have long tried to define particular eras of constitu-
tional law, but usually by focusing on the reign of particular Chief Justices. The
best scholarship, however, focuses on integrating the activities of the Court with
the larger political dynamic of the time.16 Tushnet succeeds in doing what few
have done: integrating the most recent generation of constitutional law with
broader political developments.17 The result is simple, according to Tushnet:
Polarized parties increasingly do battle, and with little ground for compromise,
little is accomplished.
A. THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
According to Tushnet, the chastened constitutional order is defined by two
key institutional characteristics: the persistence of divided government18 and the
emergence of increasingly “ideologically distinct and unified parties.”19 Be-
cause of these two central institutional dimensions, the possibility for dramatic
change is minimized. There are two parties with radically different views of
America, but neither party is able to translate its own extreme views into policy
because it must deal with the other, equally extreme party in a system of divided
government.
14. For an excellent recent overview of this scholarship, see DAVID MAYHEW, ELECTORAL REALIGN-
MENTS: THE CRITIQUE OF A GENRE (2003). See generally WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND
THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1970); JAMES SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM:
ALIGNMENTS AND REALIGNMENTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1983); V.O. Key, A Theory
of Critical Elections, 17 J. POL. 3, 4 (1955).
15. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 1.
16. For good examples of New Deal Court scholarship, see, for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998); JEFFREY
D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE (1996); RICHARD A. MAIDMENT, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE NEW
DEAL: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND ECONOMIC REGULATION, 1934–1936 (1992). On the Warren Court,
see, for example, LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).
17. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 4 (“My approach to regime principles is less Court focused than
Ackerman’s or Balkin and Levinson’s.”).
18. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 5, 7, 13, 15–16, 22–23, 26, 32, 100–01.
19. Id. at 8.
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The general population itself tends to be more ideologically divided than it
was in the previous constitutional order, according to Tushnet. “Republican
voters are more uniformly conservative and Democratic ones more uniformly
liberal than in the past.”20 Parties have a greater ability to draw favorable
congressional districts, so these voters can be better grouped together to place
ideological allies together, with “[t]he result . . . that partisan homogeneity in
Congress has increased substantially over the past several decades.”21 Tushnet
argues that this is at least partly attributable to the reapportionment decisions of
the Supreme Court, which have given greater latitude to state legislatures and
allowed them more aggressively to pursue partisan interests, without fearing
limiting constitutional principles.22
This dramatic ideological divergence—and the greater ability to use the
divergence to political advantage—means that we live in an era of divided
government. From the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 until the election of
George W. Bush, only twenty-nine out of 279 months have featured one party
controlling both the legislature and the executive.23 The result is that bipartisan-
ship, a rare characteristic of the chastened constitutional age, is necessary to
pass major legislation:
Only initiatives that have broad bipartisan support are likely to be enacted,
and polarization makes it difficult to assemble a bipartisan majority for major
policy initiatives. Both points are important. Bipartisan support can be as-
sembled under the right conditions, and divided government in itself may lead
either to “stalemate” or to a “bidding up” phenomenon, depending on the
political and policy calculations made by policymakers.24
While narrow majorities may have been sufficient to pass broad legislation in
the past, the increasing use of the filibuster has prevented such majorities from
making broad changes in the chastened constitutional order.25 In 1995 alone,
according to one notable calculation that Tushnet mentions,26 forty-four percent
of the significant pieces of legislation discussed in the Senate had to overcome
major procedural problems caused by a minority determined to prevent the
legislation’s passage.27
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 14 (“It can all be traced back to the Baker v. Carr decision . . . . Because the districts in
Congress are more and more one-party dominated, the American Congress is more extreme. What you
have in Congress after 30 years of this redistricting and more polarization by party.”) (quoting a former
member of Congress).
23. Id. at 15–16.
24. Id. at 22.
25. Id. at 23.
26. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 23.
27. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS 49 (2000); TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 2, 8–9.
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B. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CHASTENED CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth have used social science methodologies to
predict Supreme Court decisions based on the political affiliations of the
Justices.28 William Eskridge29 and others30 have focused on the Court as a
strategic actor. Some have examined the practical impact of Supreme Court
decisions.31 Tushnet creatively combines these sorts of social science methodolo-
gies with doctrinal analysis in order to define a constitutional era. Tushnet also
differs from most substantive characterizations of the last generation of constitu-
tional law, which many have described as revolutionary.32
According to Tushnet, the previous constitutional regime was defined by the
State of the Union message given by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944.33
Tushnet calls this the “New Deal-Great Society constitutional order.”34 The
New Deal-Great Society constitutional order featured a “Second Bill of Rights,”
including “the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and
recreation,”35 and rights to satisfactory medical care,36 to a quality education,37
and to protection from the burdens of growing older and other sources of
28. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
29. See especially William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip R. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term,
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28 (1994) (examining how “each branch,”
including the Court, acts strategically); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) ((“[T]his Article . . . develops
a model of the Court as a political actor in statutory interpretation. The model is based upon a game
played by the Court, Congress, and the President in statutory implementation.”).
30. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
31. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have examined how presidential elections can lead to broad
powers to make judicial appointments, and then how these judicial appointments can lead to radical
changes. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REV. 2045 (2001). Balkin and Levinson, though, discuss the processes by which constitutional change
happens, and do not extensively use social science research. Id. passim. Bruce Ackerman examines
constitutional change, but he looks at how legal and political events combine to make specific
amendments to the Constitution. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991);
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
32. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 31; Seth Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1073, 1075–76 (2001) (“[C]onstitutional adjudication has undergone a thoroughgoing paradigm
shift”); Steven G. Calabresi, A Constitutional Revolution, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1997, at A14; Linda
Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Divided They Stand, The High Court and The Triumph of Discord, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (“There is a revolution in progress at the court, with
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony M.
Kennedy and Clarence Thomas challenging long-settled doctrines governing state-federal relations, the
separation of powers, property rights and religion.”); Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise, It’s an Activist
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A33 (arguing that “conservative judicial activism is the order of
the day”); Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23 (“We are
now in the midst of a remarkable period of right-wing judicial activism.”).
33. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 1; see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004).
34. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 1.
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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economic difficulty.38 Later, President Johnson expanded much of the New Deal
order with his support of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,39 the Voting Rights Act
of 1965,40 and the creation of Medicare.41
This Second Bill of Rights became a stable part of our constitutional system,
as it came to be accepted even by Republican Presidents. Twelve years after
Roosevelt’s speech, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Interstate
Highway Act,42 a piece of legislation that would never have been signed by a
Republican president—indeed by any president—in an earlier constitutional
order. Republican President Richard M. Nixon was the first national leader to
aggressively support affirmative action programs.43 He also expanded existing
food stamp programs44 and even supported an income floor for some groups.45
By contrast, according to Tushnet, these aspirations have been “chastened in
the new order.”46 Rather than affirmative governmental action to secure the
rights mentioned in the Second Bill of Rights, government instead “provides the
structure for individuals to advance their own visions of justice.”47 This new
constitutional order “remains committed to preserving a baseline of New Deal-
Great Society protections for some quality-of-life programs . . . [t]he guiding
principle of the new regime is not that government cannot solve problems, but
that it cannot solve any more problems.”48 As Tushnet describes it:
The chastened aspirations of the new constitutional order derive from a
somewhat different view of the prerequisites of liberty and flourishing. . . .
[S]mall-scale programs with modest aims characterize the new constitutional
order: any deficiencies in the provision of health care or in income security
after retirement are to be dealt with by market-based adjustments rather than
ambitious redistributive initiatives. Similarly, poverty is to be alleviated by
ensuring that the poor obtain education and training to allow them to partici-
38. Id.
39. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§2000e (2000)).
40. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
41. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–97, 79 Stat. 286. (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
42. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84–627, 70 Stat. 374 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
43. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON’S CIVIL RIGHTS 9 (2001); Paul Marcus, The Philadelphia Plan and
Strict Racial Quotas on Federal Contracts, 17 UCLA L. REV. 817, 817–24 (1970).
44. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 121–22 (1973)
45. JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1900–1994, at 197 (1994). President
Nixon increased Social Security spending by twenty percent, and in 1974 social spending was in
general fifty-eight percent higher than it was in President Johnson’s Great Society proposals. CHARLES P.
BLAHOUS, REFORMING SOCIAL SECURITY 70 (2000).
46. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 32.
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pate actively in the labor market, rather than by providing generous public
assistance payments.49
This chastened constitutional order “began to take shape with Ronald Reagan’s
election in 1980, was given greater definition in the 1994 elections, and was
consolidated during the final years of the Clinton presidency.50 In that process,
following the success of the Republican Party in the 1994 mid-term elections,
Democratic President Bill Clinton cooperated in pursuing the policies of the
new constitutional order.51 In his first several years in office, Clinton made
deficit reduction52 and the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) central parts of his policy platform.53
In the courts, this chastened constitutional order found its home in the
“judicially minimalist” Rehnquist Court,54 a Court that Tushnet argues has not
radically redefined the powers of government.55 Tushnet argues that the major
doctrinal innovation of the Rehnquist Court—outlining a more aggressive
version of federalism—tends to be more symbolic than substantive, and the
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1, 10, 11, 13, 26, 105, 167–68.
52. See, e.g., John King, Clinton Announces Record Payment on National Debt (May 1, 2000), at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/05/01/clinton.debt/ (quoting Clinton as stating, “[w]e
should not jeopardize the longest economic expansion in history with risky tax cuts that threaten our
fiscal discipline” and citing his budget plans of 1993 and 1997 as part of this approach).
53. NAFTA was negotiated before Clinton took office, but he lobbied vigorously for its passage in
Congress, see Judith H. Bello, The Current Status of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 2
U.S.-MEX. L.J. 5, 6–7 (1994), and he negotiated some amendments to it. See Agreement on Side Deals
Reached Among NAFTA Parties, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at D3 (Aug. 16, 1993). By December
1993, Congress passed a law giving authority for NAFTA to be implemented, Pub. L. No. 103–182, 107
Stat. 1057 (1993), and President Clinton signed that law on December 8, 1993. See, e.g., Betty
Southard Murphy, NAFTA’s North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: The Present and the
Future, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 403, 403 n.2 (1995).
54. Tushnet agrees with the analysis of Cass Sunstein that the Rehnquist Court practices “judicial
minimalism.” TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 130–38. Tushnet says that “[i]f [Alexander] Bickel’s jurispru-
dence was appropriate for the New Deal-Great Society constitutional regime, Sunstein’s is equally
appropriate for the present one.” Id. at 130. Sunstein’s account is found in CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT
A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) [hereinafter, SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME]; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided]. For an excellent critique of
Sunstein’s minimalism, see Christopher Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1454 (2000).
55. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 56, 65, 66, 67, and 76. Others have agreed with Tushnet’s assessment
of the slight impact that the Rehnquist Court has had. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The
New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71; Edward Rubin,
Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37 (2001);
Keith E. Whittington, William H. Rehnquist: Nixon’s Strict Constructionist, Reagan’s Chief Justice, in
REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 8, 27 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003) (“The
Rehnquist Court has sought to play a much less prominent, if still important, role within the political
system. It has sought to limit the government less by carving out particular preferred freedoms than by
imposing new obstacles on the exercise of central government authority. Its focus is less on achieving
its preferred society than on avoiding the perceived mistakes of its own predecessors.”).
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technical powers of the federal government remain largely the same as they
were before the Rehnquist Court.56 Tushnet applies this argument to the differ-
ent threads of Rehnquist Court federalism jurisprudence. Regarding the anti-
commandeering cases such as New York v. United States57 and Printz v. United
States58 that prevent the federal government from using states to enforce federal
regulatory programs, Tushnet believes that these decisions are “[l]ess important
than they might seem at first”59 because they still permit the federal government
to directly regulate activities.
Tushnet argues that the series of Eleventh Amendment cases in which the
Rehnquist Court has limited the power of the federal government to authorize
private lawsuits against state governments for money damages are of limited
import.60 The 1908 case Ex parte Young,61 which held that a plaintiff can sue a
state official to obtain an injunction coercing enforcement of national law,
creates an “important limitation” on the federalism cases.62 The Court has also
made it clear that Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity via the Fourteenth
Amendment,63 a power that Tushnet argues has not been substantially limited,
even if the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted more narrowly re-
cently.64 Thus, life on the current Court is like life in the other branches of
56. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 56.
57. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
58. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
59. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 44.
60. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 54.
61. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
62. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 54. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Court
seemed to implicitly validate Ex parte Young. Id. at 75 (“Contrary to the claims of the dissent, we do
not hold that Congress cannot authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young over a cause of
action with a limited remedial scheme.”).
63. In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, Tushnet
notes that there the decisions of the Court have left ample room for other branches of government to
take advantage of other constitutional provisions. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 40 (stating that the
Court’s constriction of the Commerce Clause power is “limited”); id. at 58 (arguing that the Contracts
Clause is not “promising as a broad constraint” on governmental power); id. at 65 (“[t]he goal of the
constitutional law of economic regulation in the new constitutional order is to chasten the most
aggressive forms of regulation, not to revolutionize the regulatory state or restore some imagined era of
laissez-faire”) (emphasis added); id. at 66 (stating that “[n]o revolutionary return to the past” of the
nondelegation doctrine “seems likely”); id. at 83 (noting the “Court’s reluctance, at least so far, to take
on the question” of congressional power under the Spending Clause).
In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that, because the Fourteenth Amendment was later in time than the
Eleventh Amendment, Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to a law
passed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65–66.
64. Tushnet has argued:
The modest view of the Court’s decisions on the scope of the commerce power is this:
Congress may not justify regulating an activity by showing that, taken in the aggregate, the
activity has substantial effects on the national economy, unless the activity itself can fairly be
characterized as economic in nature. The Court has not limited Congress’s power to regulate
activities that cross state lines (even if the activities cannot be fairly characterized as economic
in nature) by “regulat[ing] the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” An enormous
swathe of serious national policy falls within these two rules. In particular, the entire
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government: Our fundamental commitments remain the same, even if they have
not been expanded.
II. THE METHODOLOGY OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
It was just seventeen years ago that Robert Bork was nominated to the
Supreme Court, prompting a national debate about the life of the constitution
“outside the courts.”65 Bork argued that the Founders “based a good deal upon
the good sense of the people”66 and therefore that elected representatives should
have the capacity to influence constitutional law. In response, Senator Edward
Kennedy of Massachusetts argued that “Robert Bork’s America”67 was a land
without judicial review, and hence “a land in which women would be forced
into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, [and]
rogue police could break down citizens’ doors in midnight raids.”68 Senator
Kennedy’s comments were echoed in one version or another by commentators
who worried about the “anarchy” of such a version of constitutional law.69
Not even twenty years later, studying the Constitution outside of the courts is
one of the hot topics in contemporary constitutional scholarship. However, like
the generation of constitutional scholarship before it that implicitly focused on
life outside of the courts, much of this new scholarship pays rhetorical homage
to the Constitution outside of the courts without actually studying it. If we want
to take the Constitution outside of the courts seriously, we have to change the
way we write about constitutional law. We need a legitimate populist constitu-
tional law methodology.
For many decades, one group of constitutional scholars has been engaging in
a prominent and powerful debate about the proper institutional role for courts
exercising the power of constitutional review. Yet, as will be briefly discussed
here in the context of a few examples, this scholarship tends to focus insuffi-
cient attention on the actual world of the Constitution outside the courts.
Writing in 1962, Alexander Bickel was one of the first modern constitutional
regulatory apparatus associated with the New Deal, and most of the regulations associated
with the Great Society, deal with activities that are straightforwardly economic in nature. For
example, some applications of the Endangered Species Act might be unconstitutional under
the Court’s decisions, but nearly all of the central forms of environmental regulation are
unaffected by those decisions.
Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 49
(2003).
65. For recent discussions of the theoretical issues implicated by this debate, see Symposium,
Theories of Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1377 (2005).
66. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
1987: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 114–17 (1987) (statement of
Robert H. Bork).
67. 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, Meese’s Stink Bomb, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1986, at A19; Anthony
Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Liberties Union
Denounces Meese, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1986, at A17.
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theorists to reference the Constitution outside the courts. Bickel argued that
judicial review was “deviant” because it undermined policy decisions made by
accountable, elected officials;70 judges were not accountable, at least at the
federal level.71 As a result, in difficult cases, the Supreme Court should use the
“passive virtues,” jurisdictional techniques that allowed the Court to avoid
deciding constitutional cases on the merits.72 Bickel believed that broad judicial
review inside the courts hindered constitutional accountability and interpreta-
tion outside the courts and that limited judicial review prevented judicial
involvement in polarizing political controversies.73
Bickel did not seriously engage with the actual activities of the other branches
of government.74 His argument would have been stronger if he had utilized a
case study—for instance, how other branches of government actually acted in
response to some of the judicial decisions that he believed used the passive
virtues—to prove his point about the passive virtues.
Writing in 1982, Guido Calabresi argued that “when the legislature has acted
with haste or hiding in a way that arguably infringes even upon the penumbra of
fundamental rights, courts should invalidate the possibly offending law and
force the legislature to take a ‘second look’ with the eyes of the people on it.”75
Calabresi argues that invoking this second-look doctrine aims to “to ask, cajole,
or force . . . the legislature . . . to define the new rule or reaffirm the old.”76
Calabresi believes that this dialogue-by-threat technique creates a fruitful legisla-
tive-judicial dialogue. But does it? How does the legislature respond to being
bullied by the unelected judiciary? Surely we would need to know how the
other branches of government actually responded to past examples of the
“second look doctrine” to know if this approach is normatively desirable, yet
70. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 18 (1962). Christopher Peters has written that Bickel argued for judicial “minimalism chiefly
as a method of protecting the judiciary’s own place in the constitutional system” because courts were
undemocratic and hence deviant. Peters, supra note 54, at 1457 (2000).
71. BICKEL, supra note 70, at 18.
72. Id. at 112 (arguing that “these jurisdictional techniques and like devices have fallen into
something of a state of disrepair”). Bickel focused mostly on standing, mootness, and ripeness,
doctrines comprising the core of modern constitutional justiciability doctrine.
73. Cf. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1892) (judicial review “has had a tendency to drive out questions of
justice and right, and to fill the mind[s] of legislators with thoughts of mere legality . . . . And moreover,
even in the matter of legality, they have felt little responsibility; if we are wrong, they say, the courts
will correct it”).
74. Bickel does reference Robert Dahl at one point, see BICKEL, supra note 70, at 18–19, and
overtones of Dahl appear throughout the book. For instance, compare these two comments: BICKEL, id.
at 16–28, 128 (“[S]ome do and some do not care to recognize a need for keeping the Court’s
constitutional interventions within bounds that are imposed, though not clearly defined, by the theory
and practice of political democracy.”); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 283 (1957) (“[T]o affirm that the Court supports
minority preferences against majorities is to deny that popular sovereignty and political equality, at
least in the traditional sense, exist in the United States . . . .”).
75. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 61 (1982).
76. Id. at 165-66.
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Calabresi does not have much to say on this point.
Likewise, Cass Sunstein, who has argued in favor of a “distinctive form of
judicial decision-making” (called judicial minimalism) by which a court “settles
the case before it, but leaves many things undecided,”77 could have benefited
from more comprehensively examining the Constitution outside of the courts.
Sunstein argues that judicial minimalism promotes democratic deliberation, but
in the two cases that he focuses on substantially—Washington v. Glucksberg78
and Vacco v. Quill,79 both cases involving the potential existence of a constitu-
tional “right to die”—Sunstein does not focus much attention at all on what
happened in the other branches of government. How did citizens respond to
these decisions? This seems like a central point, especially since Sunstein’s
main argument for judicial minimalism is that it would actually promote
democratic deliberation outside the courts.80 Sunstein’s book would have ben-
efited from engaging the work of his colleague David Currie on the Constitution
in Congress.81
In his earlier book on the Constitution outside of the courts, Tushnet argued
for the near total abolition of judicial review because other branches of govern-
ment could adequately interpret the Constitution.82 In that book, as in The New
Constitutional Order, Tushnet proves comfortable with scholarship from many
academic disciplines, but his arguments still could have benefited from more
evidence about how these other branches of government actually do interpret
the Constitution.83 Once again, if we to believe that it would be normatively
desirable for the other branches of government to take a more central role in
constitutional interpretation, we presumably would want to know how they have
77. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 54, at ix (1999). Sunstein also has extensively
defended judicial minimalism in a pair of earlier works. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996) [[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING]; Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things
Undecided, supra note 54.
78. 521 U.S. 702 (1997)
79. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
80. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 54, at 132 (noting that his position would be
“much strengthened by evidence that judicial decisions will in fact spur, or at least be a healthy part of,
ongoing processes of public deliberation” and that “there are empirical issues that I have not resolved”).
81. E.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801
(1999); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–29 (2001).
82. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000).
83. Tushnet does have a chapter on how the Constitution creates incentives for Congress to enforce
it, and his analysis is quite penetrating, including frequent mentions of the theories of Madison, id. at
96–99, and of Herbert Weschler, id. at 99–100. Tushnet does briefly mention how Congress handled
one particular statute, id. at 101–02, and how it handled the confirmation hearings of Justice Thomas,
id. at 109. He also has discussions of Proposition 187 from California, id. at 6, 18, 19, 30, 193-94,
200 n.67, flag-burning, id. at 22, 23, 58–60, 106, 118–30, 130, 156, 178, 179–80, but these are brief
discussions and do not include any kind of comprehensive theory about how Congress has actually
handled constitutional interpretation. Id. at 199 n.58 (“There is a common intuition that Congress
cannot be trusted to protect either individual rights or federalism issues because of its self-interest . . .
Somehow Congress’s power-maximizing interests are thought, not simply to operate alongside of, but
to displace its good faith; I know of no reason to adopt that assumption with respect to Congress but not
with respect to courts.”) (emphasis added).
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handled this responsibility in the past. None of the reviews of his earlier book
discuss this issue in any detail.84
There are other forms of contemporary constitutional scholarship that study
the Constitution outside of the courts, but the questions they are trying to
answer make the need for them to examine the actual evidence about the
behavior of other institutions less compelling. Keith Whittington, for instance,
has studied some examples of congressional constitutional interpretation from
previous generations, as a means of drawing some lessons about the behavior of
Congress and how it manipulates constitutional concepts.85 Robert Post and
Reva Siegel have argued that the Supreme Court has excessively limited the
power of Congress to enforce section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.86
Their scholarship, though, focuses more on the relationship between constitu-
tional law and culture, and how concepts and understandings that the Supreme
Court uses arise out of a general constitutional culture.87
In The New Constitutional Order, Tushnet describes a “reasonably stable set
of institutions through which a nation’s fundamental decisions are made over a
sustained period.”88 These institutions include the Supreme Court, but they also
include Congress and the executive branch. Since Tushnet’s project is self-
consciously descriptive rather than conceptual, one would expect that he would
84. Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1416
(2000); Neal Devins, Reanimator: Mark Tushnet and the Second Coming of the Imperial Presidency, 34
U. RICH. L. REV. 359 (2000); James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 215 (2000); Scott D. Gerber, The Judicial Brezhnev Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 309
(2000); Mark A. Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 373 (2000); Neil Kinopf,
The Progressive Dilemma, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2000); Joan L. Larsen, Constitutionalism
Without Courts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 983 (2000); Frank I. Michelman, Populist Natural Law (Reflections
on Tushnet’s “Thin Constitution”), 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 461 (2000); Bruce G. Peabody, Coordinate
Construction, Constitutional Thickness, and Remembering the Lyre of Orpheus, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
662 (2000); Saikrishna B. Prakash, America’s Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541 (1999); Charles Tiefer,
Comparing Alternative Approaches About Congress’s Role in Constitutional Law, 34 U. RICH. L. REV.
489 (2000).
85. KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999).
86. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND.
L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Juricentric].
87. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and Law 117
HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (“I shall argue that constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical
relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture. Although
Rehnquist Court decisions construing the scope of Section 5 power suppress this relationship, analysis
of the 2002 Term will demonstrate that the Court in fact commonly constructs constitutional law in the
context of an ongoing dialogue with culture, so that culture is inevitably (and properly) incorporated
into the warp and woof of constitutional law. It follows that to the extent that the Rehnquist Court
actually draws confidence from its announced belief that constitutional law is autonomous from culture,
that confidence is quite misplaced. Properly read, Hibbs, Grutter, and Lawrence each reveals a Court
that defines the substance of constitutional law in the context of the beliefs and values of nonjudicial
actors.”).
88. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added).
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have examined in greater detail the actual behavior of the other branches.89
Despite its stated ambition, though, the methodology used in the book could
have benefited from devoting more attention to the actual behavior of other
branches of government, thereby coming closer to fulfilling Tushnet’s admirable
promise of a complete interpretive picture of the Constitution.90 Once again,
none of the reviews notes this problem in any serious detail,91 including
89. Id. at 4 (“Ackerman’s way of thinking about our constitutional order has influenced my
approach, but I believe that Ackerman’s formalism, derived from his normative concerns, obscures our
ability to see clearly the present constitutional order.”).
90. There are other potential questions sounding in methodology that the book raises, such as some
complications related to Tushnet’s statement that the new constitutional order is not revolutionary. First
of all, how much needs to change for there to be some sort of “revolution”? Tushnet calls some changes
“substantial,” id. at 2, but does not tell us why those changes are or are not enough to make this a new
constitutional order. Second of all, when Tushnet discusses the extent of changes—particularly in
constitutional rules—does he mean doctrinal or practical? Many of the Rehnquist Court federalism
decisions are doctrinally revolutionary, but may not have had many revolutionary practical effects.
91. Michael Dorf, in his review, argues that “Tushnet devotes an unusually large portion (roughly
two thirds) of The New Constitutional Order to Supreme Court cases.” Michael Dorf, After Bureau-
rcracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1256 (2004). Dorf also suggests that “the main reason why the era of
big government is over is that most Americans and their elected representatives like it that way,” id.,
and criticizes Tushnet for focusing too much on structural factors. Dorf never, though, seriously looks
at the actual behavior of Congress or the President, or polling data about how citizens of America feel
about a variety of issues. He briefly mentions the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments as a potential
constitutionally new form of regulation. Id. at 1266 (“The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments—which
substitute a market in pollution emission credits for requirements of specific technology or specific
emissions limits—typify the first “deinstitutionalized” form of regulation.”). Besides that, I see no
mention of the Constitution outside of the courts.
In his brief review of the book, Alec Walen briefly mentions some potential activity outside of the
courts, but besides that stays focused solely on the Constitution in the courts. Alec Walen, Chastened
Ambitions, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 194, 202 (“Were that true, then it would not have been possible for the
divided government to pass the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 (adopting time limits and other measures
to reduce the welfare rolls), the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (giving the
president new powers to fight terrorism, and making it harder for convicts to appeal death sentences),
the Violence Against Women Act of 1998 (establishing a federal cause of action for violence against
women), and the USA PATRIOTAct of 2001.”).
Keith Whittington, in his review, does seem to make allusions to the kind of methodological critique
I am making. Keith Whittington, A New Order to the Age?, 19 J.L. & POL. 417 (2003). For examples,
see id. at 422 (“Tushnet backs up this conclusion with a careful, persuasive, and methodologically quite
conventional analysis of the Rehnquist Court’s major decisions. He provides a readable overview of the
Court’s work in federalism, economic liberties, separation of powers, and civil rights and civil liberties,
all supporting the chastened aspiration interpretation”); id. at 423 (“Although this legal analysis is
consistent with Tushnet’s broader argument for interpreting the present constitutional order as one of
chastened aspirations, the substantive content of these doctrinal developments is largely left un-
grounded”); id. (“[rather] than examining the substantive beliefs and policies of this political era, he has
chosen to focus on the procedural elements”); id. (“There is equally little sense of the political common
ground and terms of debate in the 1980s and 1990s. In making gridlock the main story of modern
politics, he gives short shrift to the principles that have guided recent political decision making”).
Lucas A. Powe, Jr., is the best on this point. Although he does not note how little Tushnet says on the
Constitution outside of the courts, he has much more to say about how important constitutional-order
level activity outside of the courts can be. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order,
117 HARV. L. REV. 647 (2003). For examples, see id. at 653 (“If social security or the Civil Rights Act
are examples of the prior order, welfare reform typifies the new one, as the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996”); id. at 656 (“My account begins in November 1963,
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Calabresi’s review, which argues that we have a libertarian-lite constitutional
order but does not generally examine the behavior of institutions besides the
Court,92 and thereby misses out on major weaknesses in Tushnet’s argument.93
Chapter 1 of The New Constitutional Order focuses on the “political institu-
tions of the new constitutional order” and occupies twenty-five pages.94 These
pages are full of compelling arguments about the general structure of the new
constitutional order. After these general observations, only tiny portions of other
chapters include discussions of life outside the courts.95 For instance, where are
the so-called “super-statutes”96 that have been passed since 1980, the date that
Tushnet believes marked the beginning of the new constitutional regime, and
what do these super-statutes say about the new constitutional regime? There
were major changes in domestic budget packages offered by President Reagan,
including the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198197 and the Tax Reform Act of
1986.98 These statutes substantially altered our federal spending priorities, and
Tushnet’s book would have benefited from discussion of them.
Likewise, Tushnet briefly notes that the first President Bush considered the
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to be “one of his
administration’s most important accomplishments.”99 However, besides this
comment, Tushnet only mentions the ADA in the context of the constitutional
challenges it faced in the courts.100 The same is true of the welfare reform
legislation signed by President Clinton, which Tushnet discusses only in a few
with the assassination of President Kennedy. Regardless whether Kennedy would have abandoned
Vietnam after his assumed reelection in 1964, the assassination changed the mood of the country”); id.
at 665 (“During an era of decreasing voter turnout, Reagan energized a new group of voters—“born-
again” Christians—who were already in the process of ending a decades-long, self-imposed exile from
politics”). Indeed, there is just one section that is focused mostly on the Court. Id. at 674–780. In his
review of Larry Kramer’s new book on popular constitutionalism, Powe gives many examples of
specific debates and policy agendas outside of the courts, and how Kramer misses these debates and
agendas. L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “The People” Missing in Action (And Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 855, 864–86 (2005).
92. Calabresi’s title itself notes that his Review focuses on “the Rehnquist Court.” Calabresi, supra
note 6. In the rest of his Review, Calabresi states that he wants to focus on “the record of our recent
presidents and congresses,” id. at 1026, but he only briefly mentions a few constitutional amendments
that Congress introduced but never passed, id. at 1036, and besides that just mentions in passing the
Social Security Act, the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, and the environmental laws. Id. at
1037–38.
93. The idea of a libertarian-lite constitutional order, of course, must make some mention of the No
Child Left Behind Act, the most substantial federal intervention into education in American history, as
well as the massive increase in military spending, the creation of a new national intelligence agency,
and the passage of the Patriot Act. Calabresi is silent on all of these developments.
94. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 8–33
95. See, e.g., id. at 96–101, 106–12.
96. William Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
97. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97–34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
98. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
99. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 50–52.
100. Id. at 49, 50-51, 77–78, 79.
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short passages.101
III. THE DYNAMICS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
This Part examines, however briefly, some of the evidence about the actual
behavior of other branches of government. Tushnet is generally right that the
Rehnquist Court has not been revolutionary. What Tushnet captures only in part,
though, is a changing dynamic outside of the courts. Rather than a more liberal
Democratic Party and more liberal Democratic Party voters battling a more
conservative Republican Party and more conservative Republican Party voters,
the situation is somewhat different.102 Both parties have moved to the right of
the political spectrum, so although Tushnet is right that there has been an
increase in partisanship, this has only partly been a result of greater ideological
divergences. The consequence of this dynamic is that when the parties agree to
pass something, that legislation will typically be to the right of where it would
have been a generation ago. Because Tushnet focuses substantially on judicial
decisions, he occasionally misses this dynamic and its policy consequences.103
A. THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
The new constitutional order, according to Tushnet, features two ideologi-
cally extreme parties, catering to increasingly ideologically extreme voters.104
The only way that significant legislation can be passed is if some sort of
enormously popular policy is proposed, which a bipartisan consensus of politi-
cal figures can step forward to support.105 American voters, though, are as a
whole no more polarized than they were during the New Deal-Great Society
constitutional order. The entire political debate, however, has been shifted to the
right, so that whatever compromise the parties reach is farther to the right than
the policies of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order.106
Speaking at the 1992 Republican National Convention, Pat Buchanan argued
101. Id. at 72, 114, 170.
102. Tushnet argues that “Republican voters are more uniformly conservative and Democratic ones
more uniformly liberal than in the past.” TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 14. But the definitions of
“conservative” and “liberal” have changed too, so while partisans from both sides are more loyal, all
are more conservative. Tushnet states at one point that “the mainstream of the new constitutional order
is more conservative than it has been in the recent past,” id. at 105, but that comment does not factor at
all anywhere else in his book.
103. Michael Dorf, in his review of the Tushnet book, argues that ideology in general is a central but
largely missed part of the story. Dorf, After Bureaurcracy, supra note 91, at 1251 (“Tushnet understates
the degree to which the chastened constitutional order he described simply reflects the dominant
political ideology of the nation as a whole.”).
104. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 14.
105. Id. at 22.
106. There are exceptions to this trend, of course. For example, as recent poll results from The
Economist indicate, over the last ten years support for the death penalty has decreased, while support
for legal homosexual relations and legal use of marijuana has increased. See Social Attitudes: Not Quite
Right, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.
cfm?story_id3649303. And “by a huge 42-19% margin, Americans think they are more liberal than
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that “[t]here is a kind of religious war going on in this country, a cultural war as
critical to the kind of nation we shall be as the Cold War itself, for this war is
for the soul of America.”107 Some version of Buchanan’s claim—that America
is bitterly divided—has become conventional wisdom,108 and Calabresi heartily
endorses it.109 Tushnet’s argument seems to rely on this division.110
As several commentators have recently suggested, however, the country is
not as divided as conventional wisdom would have it.111 In 1964, for example,
seventy-seven percent of Americans identified themselves with a party (fifty-
two percent as Democrats and twenty-five percent as Republicans), while only
seventy-four percent do now (thirty-seven percent Democrat, thirty-seven per-
cent Republican).112 The differences on many major issues are no more drastic
than they were a generation ago. Consider the polarizing issue of abortion.
While slightly less than fifty percent of Americans supported Roe v. Wade113
right after it was issued, a little more than sixty percent support the decision
now.114 Democrats are ten to twelve points more likely than Republicans to feel
that abortion should be “legal under any circumstances,” but only roughly
one-third of Democrats believe that.115 On the flip side, Republicans are about
five to ten points more likely to say “illegal in all circumstances,” but only
roughly one-quarter of Republicans take that position.116 Within a few percent-
age points, therefore, Democrats and Republicans agree that abortion should be
“legal under certain circumstances.” This agreement was borne out by polls
taken after the Supreme Court decided Casey v. Planned Parenthood of South-
their parents.” Id. Such a liberalizing trend, however, is not reflected in public policy or discussions
among political leaders.
107. Nancy J. Davis & Robert V. Robinson, A War for America’s Soul?: The American Religious
Landscape, in CULTURAL WARS IN AMERICAN POLITICS: CRITICAL REVIEWS OF A POPULAR MYTH 26 (Rhys
Williams ed., 1997).
108. See, e.g., David Broder, One Nation, Divisible; Despite Peace, Prosperity, Voters Agree to
Disagree, WASH. POST. Nov. 8, 2000, A1 (“The divide [goes] deeper than politics. It reach[es] into the
nation’s psyche.”); John Harwood and Shailagh Murray, Split Society: Year After Year, The Big Divide
in Politics is Race, WALL. ST. J. Dec. 19, 2002, at A1 (“[T]he real emotional splits in the country lie in
gut-level social issues.”).
109. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1025 (stating that the idea of a polarized country “seems to me to be
an obviously correct description of the current state of our political parties and, in fact, I cannot
remember a time when the two major parties were so internally unified in their mutual dislike of one
another”).
110. It is not clear to me that a “moderate” cannot make big changes anyway; perhaps both parties
can meet in the center and pass legislation that makes a major policy change (perhaps this is what the
No Child Left Behind Act was), unless “moderate” is defined in a way that by definition precludes
“moderates” from proposing major changes.
111. For notable dissents from the divided country thesis, see MORRIS P. FIORINA, CULTURE WAR? THE
MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2004); Robert Samuelson, Polarization Myths, WASH. POST, Dec. 3,
2003, at A29.
112. Mark Gersh, Battlefield Erosion, BLUEPRINT MAG., Dec. 13, 2004, available at http://
www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid127&subid900056&contentid253080.
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. FIORINA, supra note 111, at 36 fig. 4.1.
115. Id. at 43 fig. 4.7.
116. Id. at 43 fig. 4.8.
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eastern Pennsylvania117 in 1992. One survey asked respondents if they agreed
with Casey after a brief description of its holding.118 Fifty-eight percent of both
Democrats and Republicans said yes.119
Instead of Tushnet’s claim that the parties are more divided now than in the
New Deal-Great Society order, and therefore meet in the middle, I would say
that the parties are just as—but no more—divided as before, but that they are
divided from a point farther to the right than a generation ago.
To be sure, Tushnet notes that the “mainstream in the new constitutional
order is more conservative than it has been even in the recent past.”120 But he
does not expand on this important argument that the center of gravity has
shifted substantially. It should matter just as much where on the political
spectrum the parties are as how far apart on that spectrum they are. How far
apart they are may provide evidence about the frequency with which the parties
will agree on legislation, because it will determine how close the positions of
the parties are and therefore how close they are to compromises. But where on
the spectrum they are indicates what type of substantive agreements they will
reach when they do pass legislation.
Tushnet argues that the Democratic Party is more liberal than it was a
generation ago, and while this may be true on some issues, it is not true across
the board. In the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order, the Democratic
Party nominated clear liberals like George McGovern, Hubert Humphrey, and
Adlai Stevenson for President. In the new constitutional order, the Democratic
Party has nominated a pro-life Southern Governor (Jimmy Carter), as well as
movement centrists like Bill Clinton and Al Gore. Most recently, John Kerry ran
on a pro-war, pro-tax cut platform.121
The traditional stalwarts of the Democratic Party, at least in the New Deal-
Great Society constitutional order, have been organized labor, minorities, and,
more recently, women. Centrist groups like the Democratic Leadership Council
117. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
118. Survey respondents were read the following passage:
As you may know, the Supreme Court recently decided that a woman still has the right to have
an abortion until the fetus is viable, but said that certain restrictions—such as a twenty-four
hour waiting period, parental consent for girls under eighteen, and requiring doctors to
provide information on alternatives to abortion—are legal as long as an undue burden is not
placed on a woman seeking an abortion. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the
Supreme Court’s decision?
American Viewpoint, July 8–13, 1992.
119. Id.
120. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 105.
121. The Democratic National Convention Committee, in its platform statement for the 2004
Democratic national convention, noted that “[p]eople of good will disagree” about the justness of going
to war against Iraq. It talked about “strengthening” the military. On domestic issues, it spoke of the
importance of “free markets” and “[c]utting taxes.” See THE DEMOCRATIC NAT’L CONVENTION COMM.,
STRONG AT HOME, RESPECTED IN THE WORLD: THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM FOR AMERICA,
available at http://a9.g.akamai.net/7/9/8082/v002/www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf (last vis-
ited Dec. 1, 2004).
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(DLC) and the Progressive Policy Institute have now joined these groups at the
core of the party.122 Charles Peters has called this new ideology of the Demo-
cratic Party “neoliberalism.”123 The efforts by these neoliberal groups to defeat
Governor Howard Dean’s candidacy from the left for President in 2004 substan-
tially undermined his campaign, demonstrating their power.124 It was a Demo-
cratic President who, as discussed later, proposed the biggest reduction in
welfare programs since the creation of welfare.125 A Democratic President
aggressively promoted the reduction of the deficit, even though traditionally
deficit reduction had been a conservative issue.126
Democrats in the Congress have also become more conservative on many
issues. For instance, in the vote on the first Persian Gulf War, Democrats in the
House of Representatives overwhelmingly voted against supporting the first
President Bush in his effort to pursue military action against Iraq, as did Senate
Democrats.127 By contrast, in 2002, forty percent of House Democrats sup-
ported the second Gulf War, and the majority of Senate Democrats supported
the war.128 The Democratic Party has long been the party that was hesitant
about free trade. When Congress voted on legislation to authorize NAFTA,
though, nearly half of House Democrats voted in favor of it, and half of Senate
Democrats voted in favor of it.129 The platform of the Democratic Party in 2004
supported the war in Iraq, the Patriot Act, and tax cuts.130
This move to the right by the Democrats clearly angered many traditional
liberals, and the anger of these liberals serves as further proof of the move to the
right. It explains the fact that Ralph Nader received 2,882,955 votes in the 2000
presidential election while referencing the parties as the “Republicrats” and the
candidates as “Gush and Bore.”131 It explains the early success of Governor
Howard Dean in 2003, before he was defeated thanks to the assistance of the
neoliberal groups of the party.
The Republican Party has also become more conservative on a broad range of
issues. This started with President Harry Truman’s executive orders in 1948,
one desegregating the armed forces132 and one mandating non-discriminatory
122. Indeed, the only President that the Democratic Party has elected during this new constitutional
order, Bill Clinton, was one of the founding members of the DLC and was a former president of the
DLC. Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 11 (observing that Clinton liked to say “I hope you’re all aware
we’re all Eisenhower Republicans . . . and we are fighting the Reagan Republicans”).
123. RANDALL ROTHENBERG, THE NEOLIBERALS 244-45 (1984).
124. For an excellent discussion of the Democratic Leadership Council, see KENNETH L. BAER,
REINVENTING DEMOCRATS (2000).
125. See infra notes 212–26.
126. See supra note 52.
127. KENNETH BAER, REINVENTING DEMOCRATS: LIBERALISM FROM REAGAN TO CLINTON 13 (2000).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 121.
131. Sam Howe Verhovek, What Makes Ralph (and Pat) Run, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, § 4 (The
Week in Review), at 5.
132. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.FR. 722 (1948), 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
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employment practices in the federal government.133 Led by Strom Thurmond,
many angry Democrats switched parties and became core supporters of the
Republican Party.134 In 1964, conservative Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater
won the Republican nomination by positioning himself as fundamentally op-
posed to the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order.135 With the success
of Goldwater in the South, and later Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” of
using racial issues to separate minorities and working-class whites, and bring
the latter into the Republican Party, the Republican Party began to be dominated
by westerners and southerners, and started consistently to be more conservative
than it was earlier. The nomination and then the election to two terms of Ronald
Reagan continued this process.
Before 1994, though, there was still some way to go before the Republicans
became solidly conservative. Centrists such as Howard Baker, George H.W.
Bush and James Baker were involved in the Reagan Administration, and the two
Republican leaders in Congress (Bob Michel in the House and Bob Dole in the
Senate) were centrists. With the landslide of 1994, and then the departure of
Senator Dole from the Senate to run for President, two more conservative
southerners, Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott, became the new leaders.
Remaining moderates had a hard time in the party. Former Massachusetts
Republican Governor William Weld, appointed to be the ambassador to Mexico
(by a Democratic President as an act of compromise), was rejected by the
Senate at least partially because of Weld’s more moderate views.136 In the
election of 2000, conservative interest groups such as The National Right to
Life Committee and the Christian Coalition attacked moderate Republican
presidential candidate John McCain. Organizations like the Club for Growth
targeted moderate Republican senators like Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island and
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania.137 The result is that there are only a handful of
prominent Republican moderates remaining, figures such as George Pataki of
New York, former Governor and head of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Christine Todd Whitman, and former Secretary of State Colin Powell.
After the election to the Senate of staunch conservatives such as Jim DeMint of
South Carolina and Tom Coburn of Oklahoma in 2004, there are by most
estimates only five moderate Republicans left in the usually more moderate
Senate (Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe of Maine, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode
Island, Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and John McCain of Arizona).
Indeed, in many ways the country in general is more conservative than it was
a generation ago, and this is reflected in the changing division of power between
the two major political parties. No Democratic candidate for President has won
133. Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (1948), 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (July 26, 1948).
134. MICHAEL LIND, UP FROM CONSERVATISM: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG FOR AMERICA 24 (1996).
135. BAER, supra note 127, at 16–17.
136. Id.
137. Alison Mitchell, Ads Brawl in a Never-Ending Political Season, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2001, at
A13.
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a majority of the popular vote in nearly thirty years. In 1994, after being out of
the majority in the House for forty years,138 the Republicans won 230 seats.139
They continued their success over the next decade, winning 226 seats in 1996,
223 in 1998, 221 in 2000, 229 in 2002 and 231 in 2004.140 In 1936, at the start
of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order, the Democratic Party
controlled 333 seats in the House; today it controls 205.141 This earlier Demo-
cratic domination was not just at the start of the New Deal-Great Society
constitutional order; in the 89th Congress, in office from 1965-67, Democrats
controlled 295 seats and Republicans 240 seats. In 1936, at the start of the New
Deal-Great Society constitutional order, the Democratic Party controlled 75
Senate seats; today it controls only 48.142 The same trend is apparent at the state
level. A generation ago, Democrats controlled over two-thirds of seats in state
legislatures.143 In 2002, for the first time since 1952, Republicans won a
majority of state legislative seats.144 A generation ago, Democrats controlled
about two-thirds of statehouses.145 Today, Republicans control 27, and Demo-
crats 23.146
Americans have also tended increasingly to identify themselves with the
Republican Party instead of with the Democratic Party. Fifty years ago, nearly
fifty percent of Americans identified themselves as Democrats,147 more than
twenty percentage points more than identified themselves as Republicans.148 In
1982, Democrats had a fourteen point edge in identification (forty to twenty-six
percent).149 By 1992, the same proportion of the American population identified
themselves as Republicans as identified themselves as Democrats.150 In a world
in which both parties have moved on the ideological spectrum, and the conserva-
tive party has enjoyed a political resurgence, it is hard to believe that these
structural dynamics would lead to no major substantive changes.
A. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEW REGIME
1. The Rehnquist Court
As a part of the new constitutional order, the Rehnquist Court has been













150. About 17% Americans generally identify themselves as liberals, and the rest define themselves
as either “middle-of-the-road” (about 40%) or “conservative” (about 35%). Id.
2005] 1081THE CURRENT GENERATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
subject to the same institutional dynamics discussed earlier. Two Justices (Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist) were appointed
before President Reagan was elected, so they were appointed in the earlier
constitutional regime. Seven Justices have been appointed during this constitu-
tional order, five by Republican Presidents (Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas) and two by a Democratic President (Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer).
For each one of the nominations, the argument earlier about the shift to the
right holds true: The Republican Presidents considered conservative to very
conservative nominees, while the Democratic Party considered slightly liberal
to centrist nominees. This has led to a range of decisions that are, by and large,
to the right of where they would have been a generation ago, although Tushnet
is surely correct that these decisions have not been extremely conservative.
When faced with a choice between a moderately conservative and a very
conservative decision, the Rehnquist Court has often opted for the moderately
conservative decision. This moderate element of the Rehnquist Court becomes
evident by glancing, once again, at the actual life of the Constitution outside of
the courts. In many instances, Congress was able to create alternative pieces of
legislation that were almost identical to the original statutes that the Court
invalidated.151 To be sure, Tushnet’s compelling argument that the Court has not
revolutionized our political and daily lives may be true of all Supreme Courts,
but that is a broader claim, beyond the scope of this Review.
Tushnet argues that the anti-commandeering cases, New York and Printz, left
ample room for the federal government to pursue its desired goals.152 As a
result, Congress has passed several laws that would coerce state courts, for
instance, and has passed several of these pieces of legislation. One such law, the
Y2K Act of 1999153 specifies a procedure to be followed in disputes in both
federal and state court related to Y2K failures, specifically because such proce-
dures were necessary to ensure that Y2K problems “do not unnecessarily
disrupt interstate commerce.”154 The statute requires potential plaintiffs to send
written notice to defendants before bringing suit, and to delay filing for a
specified period pending possible settlement.155 This statute also requires parties
to abide by a series of special pleading requirements156 and describes a special
151. After Lopez and Kimel, the Court was able to pass legislation to respond to the Court’s
decision. On a related point. Calabresi’s argument that the laws invalidated in the federalism cases were
“major federal statutes,” Calabresi, supra note 6, at ___ (emphasis added), seems hard to sustain. While
the Americans with Disabilities Act is a major statute, the provisions called into question by Court
decisions were minor provisions and could still be enforced in other ways. The Violence Against
Women Act had only been used in a small number of cases, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
after it was invalidated in Boerne, was quickly replaced by another statute.
152. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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set of rules regarding class actions.157 The Y2K statute illustrates how much
room the New York and Printz Courts had left for Congress. While several
senators debated its constitutionality, raising serious concerns,158 Congress still
was able to pass it.
Indeed, the argument that the Rehnquist Court has not radically transformed
the daily life of the nation is perhaps most strongly reinforced by its most
high-profile decision: Bush v. Gore.159 Surprisingly, this case hardly features in
the Tushnet book,160 in the Calabresi review,161 or indeed in many of the
general reviews of the tenure of the Rehnquist Court.162 Many felt—and still
feel—that the case “is one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in
American history.”163 At some level, this is absolutely and undeniably true: The
Supreme Court intervened in the midst of a closely divided and contested
presidential election. That alone is enough to make it a subject of substantial
interest.
In terms of immediate impact, though, the idea that the case is “worse than
Dred Scott”164 is not quite correct. The Bush v. Gore doctrinal principle—that
equal protection requires “formulation of uniform rules to determine [voters’]
157. § 6614(a)-(b).
158. Surprisingly, there were objections by many Democrats. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) argued
that the bill is “an arrogant dismissal of the basic constitutional principle of federalism.” 145 CONG.
REC. S8020 (daily ed. July 1, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Senator Fritz Hollings (D-S.C.) believed
that the statute ignored the Tenth Amendment. 145 CONG. REC. S4411 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1999)
(statement of Sen. Hollings).
159. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
160. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 3, 7, 32, 127–28, 136, 139, 198 n.182. The first two references to the
case are in the context of an argument made by others about the case, to which Tushnet just briefly
references. Id. at 3, 7. Other references are generally brief. Id. at 32, 136, 139, 198 n.182.
161. Calabresi only mentions the case twice. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 1048, 1059.
162. None of the other reviews of the Tushnet book discuss the case in any great detail. Dorf, supra
note 91, at 1249 n.22 (mentioning the case only as it is cited in the title of another article); Powe, The
Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, supra note 91, at 648, 673, 678, 680 (briefly mentioning the
case as an example of how one might argue that the Rehnquist Court is revolutionary); Walen, supra
note 114, at 204 n.42 (briefly mentioning the case); Whittington, supra note 91 (failing to mention the
case). John McGinnis’s overview of the Rehnquist Court, probably the best before Tushnet’s marvelous
effort, says the case is not worth studying. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 521 n. 175 (2002). (“In any
event, Bush v. Gore concerned a putative constitutional crisis and not the construction of constitutive
structures to generate beneficial social norms on a day-to-day basis, which is the subject of this
Article.”). Thomas Merrill’s piece has a slightly more sustained discussion of the case. Thomas W.
Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569,
650–51 (2003).
163. Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think about Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 20
(2002).
164. Jed Rubenfeld, Worse than Dred Scott, in BUSH V. GORE: A QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce A.
Ackerman ed., 2002); Sanford Levinson, Return of Legal Realism, THE NATION, Jan. 8, 2001 (“The
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, however, seems an exercise in low rather than high politics . . . . [It] is
all too easily explainable as the decision by five conservative Republicans—at least two of whom are
eager to retire and be replaced by Republicans nominated by a Republican president—to assure the
triumph of a fellow Republican who might not become president if Florida were left to its own legal
process.”).
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intent”165—was quite broad. This principle, despite one attempt by a panel of
the Ninth Circuit in the California recall case,166 has not been used in any great
detail by any other court since Bush v. Gore.167 By the time President Bush was
sworn in as President in 2001, it appeared that Bush would have won even if
Gore had succeeded with the claims that he pressed in court.168 Bush v. Gore
has not affected public respect for the Court,169 despite what some predicted.170
165. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106 (2000).
166. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003). The panel
relied on Bush v. Gore to establish the proposition that “right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement
or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise
of the franchise.” Id. at 895 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105, quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 555 (1964)). Because “the fundamental right to have votes counted in the special recall election is
infringed because the pre-scored punchcard voting systems used in some California counties are
intractably afflicted with technologic dyscalculia,” Southwest Voter Registration Educ., 344 F.3d at 892,
the Ninth Circuit panel delayed the recall election. On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit overturned
this decision. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003). The
en banc panel discussed Bush v. Gore very briefly in one place, id. at 917, and only slightly more in
depth in another place. Id. at 918 (“In Bush v. Gore, the leading case on disputed elections, the court
specifically noted: ‘The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their
expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections.’”) (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 109 (2000)).
167. My research indicates that the case has been cited by courts 124 times since it was issued, but
never as a central part of the decision of any court (Westlaw search on November 1, 2004).
168. See, e.g., Review Shows Bush Gained 6 Votes in Miami-Dade County, FLA TIMES UNION, at B3
(Jan 16, 2001).
169. In September of 2000, nearly two-thirds of Americans expressed confidence in the Court; in
June 2001, the number was essentially the same. Jeffrey M. Jones, Hispanics, Whites Rate Bush
Positively, While Blacks Are Much More Negative, Gallup News Service, June 21, 2001. Tushnet, in
his one, slightly longer, discussion of Bush v. Gore, says this is because Republicans viewed the Court
in even higher terms and Democrats in even worse terms. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 127-28 (“Survey
evidence indicates that contrary to the views of some, mostly liberal, scholars, the Court as an
institution did not suffer substantial damage to its reputation, at least in the short term, by giving the
2000 presidential electon to George W. Bush. What did happen is more interesting: The Court suffered
no net harm, because its losses among Democrats were offset by gains among Republicans.”). This was
true at first, but now the numbers have changed back to their pre-Bush v. Gore levels.
170. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The endorsement of [the
majority’s position] can only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges
throughout the land. . . . Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the
winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”); id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“T]he participation in the work of the electoral commission by five Justices, including Justice Bradley,
did not lend that process legitimacy. Nor did it assure the public that the process had worked fairly,
guided by the law. Rather, it simply embroiled Members of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby
undermining respect for the judicial process. [A]bove all, in this highly politicized matter, the
appearance of a split decision runs the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the Court itself.
That confidence is a public treasure. It has been built slowly over many years, some of which were
marked by a Civil War and the tragedy of segregation. It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any
successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself. . . . [W]e do risk a
self-inflicted wound—a wound that may harm not just the Court, but the Nation.”); ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000, at 3 (2001) (“The five
Justices who ended election 2000 . . . have damaged the credibility of the U.S. Supreme Court, and
their lawless decision . . . promises to have a more enduring impact on Americans than the outcome of
the election itself.”).
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It is possible that the Rehnquist Court decisions were dramatically important,
but more because of their role in consolidating earlier, more liberal decisions on
controversial social issues, simply by defying expectations. For instance, Roe v.
Wade171 was a controversial decision even at the time it was issued. When
Ronald Reagan took control of the Republican Party, opposition to Roe became
part of the Republican Party platform.172 The Reagan Justice Department
decided to push to have the Court overrule Roe.173 With the appointment of new
Justices, Justices that everyone assumed would be opposed to Roe, the demise
of the case seemed imminent.
With the appointment of Clarence Thomas in 1991, Justice White was the
only remaining Justice appointed by a Democratic President, but he had op-
posed Roe. The Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, 174 invalidating a Pennsylvania law requiring a husband’s
consent for abortion, was something of a surprise. Justice Kennedy had earlier
joined the opinion for the Court in Webster and had decided to confront Roe.175
But in Casey, he joined Justices O’Connor and Souter in writing for the Court to
uphold the “essence of Roe.”176 Given the expectations of what was going to
happen to Roe, the fact that Roe was legitimated in this way reiterated how hard
it would be to change Roe.
The same dynamic has prevailed for the use of race in government decisions.
At its political and policy peak, affirmative action was still not a popular policy
with the Court. Even in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,177 the
Court, although permitting race as a consideration in college admissions,178 was
sharply critical of the quota policy used by the University of California at Davis
Medical School.179 In 1989, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,180 the
Court invalidated an affirmative action program for minority businesses in
Richmond, Virginia. The Court decided that “the standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification.”181 It seemed that either Bakke would be
overruled, as it was at the state level via initiatives in a variety of states, or that
the application of strict scrutiny truly would be “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”182
171. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
172. See David M. O’Brien, Reagan Justice Policy, in W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE & HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM,
EDS., THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY: PRAGMATIC CONSERVATISM AND ITS LEGACIES (2003).
173. Id.
174. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
175. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 498 (1989).
176. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
177. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
178. Id. at 319-20.
179. Id.
180. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
181. Id. at 494.
182. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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Nonetheless, the Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger183 affirmed the
Bakke holding that a “[s]tate has a substantial interest that legitimately may be
served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive
consideration of race and ethnic origin.”184 The Court explicitly addressed—and
independently affirmed—the analysis in Bakke,185 solidifying the legality of
affirmative action in the face of social and political expectations that Bakke
would be overruled and that any consideration of race would be forbidden.
In many areas, of course, the Court has adopted quite conservative positions,
but Tushnet understates this by focusing mostly on federalism decisions.186 The
Court, for instance, has been incredibly strict in its rulings regarding desegrega-
tion efforts, saying that continued de facto segregation is permissible if it is due
to reasons of individual choice and/or problems with inherent constraints on
judicial capacity to remedy segregation.187 The result has been a large number
of lower court cases ending desegregation efforts,188 and the massive re-
segregation of the South.
And the Rehnquist Court has also consistently ruled in favor of the govern-
ment in criminal procedure cases, which occupy a substantial portion of the
Court’s docket. In 1989, in Teague v. Lane,189 the Court made it much harder to
obtain habeas corpus relief.190 The Court has also enforced a narrow interpreta-
tion of the limits that the Fourth Amendment places on law enforcement
officials.191 These decisions and areas of law make a relatively brief appearance
in Tushnet’s book, which is problematic given their importance to most people’s
lives—a single Fourth Amendment decision, for example, may affect the day-to-
day decisions of thousands of police officers and the millions of citizens who
interact with them.
183. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
184. Id. at 328.
185. Id. (stating that Bakke had served as the “touchstone for constitutional analysis”).
186. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 36-57, 82-90 (discussing issues related to federalism); id. at 57–73
(briefly discussing each of the many other areas of constitutional law).
187. E.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992) (holding that a court’s discretion to order the
incremental withdrawal of its supervision in a school desegregation case must be exercised in a manner
consistent with the purposes and objectives of its equitable power); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89
(1994) (noting that “[t]he ultimate inquiry is ‘whether the constitutional violator has complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination
have been eliminated to the extent practicable’”) (internal citations omitted).
188. NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2001); Belk v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed., 269 F.3d 305 (11th Cir. 2001).
189. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
190. Under Teague, a prisoner cannot enforce a “new rule” of law in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding (with only two narrow exceptions) if it turns out that this “new rule” was announced after
the prisoner’s conviction became final. See Odell v. Netherland , 521 U.S. 151 (1997).
191. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002);
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989);
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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2. The Political Branches
A great degree of legal scholarship, to the extent it focuses on life outside of
courts, focuses on larger political trends without discussing public policy
developments.192 Tushnet is right to direct us to these developments as a central
part of the story of any constitutional order.193 In reality, as Theodore Lowi put
it, the changes of the last generation “left all of the New Deal state intact but
made it almost impossible for it to work. Drastic tax cuts coupled with mainte-
nance of defense [] commitments effectively killed government capacity.”194
Because the political discussion started from a more conservative point, the
policy outcomes were far to the right of the policies of the previous generation.
This all started when Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980, winning
forty-four out of fifty states. Reagan had campaigned as the first ideological
conservative since Barry Goldwater in 1964, and his election has been analyzed
by some as the beginning of a new age of American politics.195 In 1981, Reagan
started to promote his budget. The Democrats objected to some of his proposals,
but many started from the quite conservative position that there should be broad
tax cuts for all income brackets. The eventual substantive result was dramatic:
the Reagan budget cut taxes on the top income bracket from seventy percent to
twenty-eight percent, severely cut food stamp programs, and cut billions of
dollars other social service programs.196
In 1985, Reagan proposed a budget that would have eliminated thirteen
important domestic social spending programs.197 Democrats again started from
the point of agreeing that some of these programs should be limited; they just
did not favor abolishing them altogether.198 Reagan also proposed altering
Social Security, by increasing some benefits but tightening the administration of
the program and limiting disability benefits.199 In the final vote the Reagan bill
192. Without a doubt, Peter Schuck is right to note several of the reasons that law professors do not
engage in empirical research: The lack of training, time constraints, ideology, absence of rewards for
such research, and so on. Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?,
39 J. LEG. EDUC. 323, 331-33 (1989). Unlike doing surveys or other forms of “empirical” research,
though, studying the activities of Congress can be done in substantial fashion by reading the statute
books and the formal records of Congress.
193. Tushnet himself admits this. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that the “constitutional order
extends beyond the Supreme Court and includes the national political parties, Congress, and the
presidency”); id. at 4 (“I believe that constitutional principles can be, and typically are, reflected in the
statutes that characterize successive constitutional orders”).
194. See GARY WILLS, REAGAN’S AMERICA xiv (2000) (quoting Lowi).
195. See generally ROBERT DALLEK, RONALD REAGAN: THE POLITICS OF SYMBOLISM (1999); see also
John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill, Overview, in THE REAGAN RECORD: AN ASSESSMENT OF AMERICA’S
CHANGING DOMESTIC PRIORITIES 1 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 1984) (“Not since 1932 has
there been such a redirection of public purposes.”).
196. See WILLS, supra note 194, at 13–14.
197. CHARLES P. BLAHOUS III, REFORMING SOCIAL SECURITY 18 (2000).
198. Id.
199. SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN, THE REAL DEAL: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF SOCIAL
SECURITY 186–87 (1999).
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passed a Democratic Senate and House.200
President Clinton, the former head of the centrist Democratic Leadership
Council (DLC), defeated several more liberal competitors in the Democratic
primaries in 1992, such as Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa and former Governor
Jerry Brown of California, and became the Democratic nominee for President.
Clinton ran from the political center, and former DLC policy activists such as
Bruce Reed dominated his Administration. Initially, though, President Clinton
pushed a series of aggressively old-fashioned liberal initiatives. It was at least
partially the failure of these initiatives (coupled with the midterm losses suf-
fered in 1994, perhaps because of these failures) that caused his retreat back to
the center, and the solidification of the much more conservative new constitu-
tional order.
The first failure was his health care plan, called the Health Security Act.201
All citizens and legal immigrants would have received a card guaranteeing them
health care benefits. This program, as Joe Klein noted, was “more of an Old
than a New Democrat”202 policy solution, and the Clinton health care proposal
did not survive in Congress, barely attracting the support of his own party.
President Clinton’s first budget reflected the new constitutional order. Clin-
ton, a Democratic President, proposed cutting spending by hundreds of billions
of dollars,203 including cutting $2.8 billion in Title XX funds that provided
family support.204 He also proposed cutting taxes by $351 billion over ten
years,205 and making substantial changes in the structure of several social
welfare programs. While the parties bitterly disagreed about their respective
budget proposals, the discussion was already far to the right of where one would
have expected it to be in the previous constitutional order. Eventually, Clinton’s
budget passed, but without a single Republican vote in either the House or the
Senate.206
The debate about the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
further demonstrates the increasingly conservative attitudes of voters in the
country and of the parties. Liberals had consistently opposed free trade agree-
ments in the past.207 While Representatives Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and
200. Id.
201. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong. § 1001 (1993).
202. JOE KLEIN, THE NATURAL: THE MISUNDERSTOOD PRESIDENCY OF BILL CLINTON 119 (2002).
203. HOWARD JACOB KARGER & DAVID STOESZ, AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY: A PLURALIST
APPROACH 238 (2002).
204. Id. at 425.
205. Id. at 238.
206. Lloyd N. Cutler, All for None, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1993, at C7. I am not arguing that the
parties are identical, but rather that they are more conservative than they were a generation ago. Clearly,
there are big differences—in regards to the Clinton budget bill, for instance, in addition to the spending
increases the Democratic proposal to raise taxes on higher income brackets was approved. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–66, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 312. See also
CHARLES P. BLAHOUS III, REFORMING SOCIAL SECURITY (2000).
207. I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 222–28 (3d ed. 1995).
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David Bonior (D-MI) opposed NAFTA throughout its consideration,208 the
leader of the Democratic Party, President Clinton, supported it. Republican
leaders supported it as well. This was demonstrated by a public appearance in
September 1993 in which President Clinton stood with Presidents Ford, Carter
and President Bush Sr. to demonstrate their solidarity in support of NAFTA.209
NAFTA passed 234 to 200 in the House, with one-third of Democrats and
two-thirds of Republicans voting for it. In the Senate, it passed by a vote of
sixty-one to thirty-eight.210
The same dynamic prevailed when President Clinton pushed welfare reform,
with increasingly conservative parties battling, but battling far to the right of
where they had been a generation ago. In the New Deal-Great Society constitu-
tional order, President Nixon spoke of a guaranteed minimum income.211 When
the welfare debate started under the Clinton Administration, politics were very
different. President Clinton announced that he wanted to “end welfare as we
know it . . . to change it from a system based on dependence to a system that
works toward independence . . . to change it so that the focus is clearly on
work.”212 The welfare reform bill that President Clinton introduced in Congress
on June 21, 1994, as the Work and Responsibility Act (WARA) of 1994 was far
to the right of what any Democratic President would have proposed in the last
constitutional order. Its treatment of key concepts like time limits and work
requirements related to welfare payments were particularly conservative.213
Again, this is not to say that the Republican proposal was not very different,
or that there were not strong partisan disagreements, as Tushnet’s description of
the new institutional order would suggest. For instance, Clinton vetoed the first
two reform proposals sent to him because he stated that they were “too harsh on
children.”214 After the eventual compromise welfare bill was passed, several
liberal figures, including Assistant Health and Human Services Secretary Peter
Edelman, resigned in protest.215
The substantive change that resulted from this new institutional dynamic was
surely very significant. As historian Charles Noble wrote:
The changes were historic. AFDC was converted to a block grant, ending its
entitlement status. A tough work requirement was imposed: the law required
208. Id. at 16.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 168, 197 (1994).
212. William Clinton, Remarks by the President to Officials of Missouri and Participants of the
Future Now Program (June 14, 1994), available at 1994 WL 258369, at 3.
213. See generally Larry Cata Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: The Futility of Ending Welfare
as We Know It, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1995).
214. Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks New Welfare Bill, Saying G.O.P. Plan is Too Harsh, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1995, at 4.
215. See, Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at
43.
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states to place at least 25% of cash welfare recipients into jobs or work
programs by 1997, and 50% by 2002. Adults who failed to find work within
two years were to be denied all federal funds. No one could receive federal
cash assistance for more than five years. States could deny welfare benefits to
women who had additional children while on welfare, and to unmarried
persons under eighteen. Federal funds were denied to unmarried parents under
eighteen who did not live with an adult and attend school. Legal immigrants’
access to any form of public assistance was radically limited. In one fell swoop, the
nation had given up its commitment to income maintenance as a right.216
Rather than an ideologically liberal party battling—and failing to agree—with
an ideologically conservative party, in fact the evidence from the past genera-
tion seems to demonstrate that two parties, both farther to the right of where
they were a generation ago, now reach the occasional agreement far to the right
of the policies of the past generation.
CONCLUSION
It is always difficult to know when one constitutional order stops and another
begins. Is it too early to say that we are in a new constitutional order? Some
have suggested that September 11, for instance, could result in a general
increase in trust in government, leading to a re-evaluation of federalism and
other constitutional structures and a potentially new constitutional order.217
While trust in government did increase at first,218 it is now sunk back to its
pre-September 11th depths.219
So what will the future hold for our constitutional order?220 For one thing,
foreign policy has once again emerged as an issue of substantial concern for the
American people. In June of 2002, the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee publicized a poll that showed that more than half of likely voters felt
that domestic issues were the most important to them, while less than one in
three voters felt that foreign policy and the war on terrorism were the most
important issues.221 But the 2002 elections were a clear triumph for the Republi-
216. CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE
STATE 128 (1997).
217. See, e.g., Powe, supra note 93, at 680-87; Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National
Authority?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2001, § 4, at 14.
218. See Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Poll: Americans’ Trust in Government Grows, Sept. 28,
2001, at http://members.cox.net/fweil/WP010928.htm.
219. See Claudia Deane, Trust in Government Declines: Post-9/11 Jump in Americans’ Confidence
in Washington is Fading, WASH. POST, May 31, 2002, at A29, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagenamearticle&node&contentIdA36238-2002May30.
220. Although Tushnet’s book was published in 2003, it is almost entirely about events predating the
presidency of George W. Bush. For instance, his only mention of the second Bush presidency is his
speculation that the new President Bush might look at to Abraham Lincoln as a guide about how to
exercise presidential leadership during times of potential crisis. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 108.
221. Press Release, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, More Good News for Demo-
crats, June 26, 2002 (on file with author).
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cans and their use of foreign policy and national security issues to defeat
Democrats such as Max Cleland of Georgia. The war in Iraq and terrorism were
by far the most important issues of the presidential campaign in 2004. By an
eighteen-point margin, voters said that they trusted President Bush more than
Senator Kerry to handle the war on terrorism. This explains President Bush’s
significant gains among women, particularly white working women.222 Does
this portend a unified Republican government,223 riding the coattails of its more
popular foreign policy, and presiding over a government with the voting majori-
ties that would enable it to push a strong conservative agenda?
And what about the Supreme Court? If recent terms are any example, perhaps
the Court is moving to the left. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs,224 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the popular Family and
Medical Leave Act, despite previous pro-state decisions that indicated the
statute might be vulnerable.225 In Grutter v. Bollinger,226 the Court used broad
language to validate race-conscious programs. In Lawrence v. Texas,227 the
Court spoke of “liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions”228 in invalidating state sodomy prohibitions.
These cases are also interesting from a comparative institutional perspective.
It is hard to imagine the new Republican Congress voting to approve any of
these decisions, yet it is also hard to imagine that a majority of the American
people would disagree with the decisions. With unified Republican government
for at least two more years, and likely more, perhaps the near future will involve
a very conservative President and Congress doing battle with a more moderate
Court (and country).
No matter what is to come in the future, though, Tushnet’s comprehensive
and compelling book paints a clear way forward for constitutional scholarship.
In the era of popular constitutionalism, looking at Supreme Court decisions
alone should not suffice. Tushnet shows us how to avoid this yet still focus on
judicial decisions: we can integrate judicial decisions into a larger political and
social fabric that, when all put together, create what can be called a “constitu-
tional order.”
222. See Will Marshall, Heartland, BLUEPRINT MAG., Dec. 13, 2004, available at http://www.ndol.org/
ndol_ci.cfm?kaid127&subid171&contentid253055.
223. There are, of course, two ways of viewing the elections of 2004. On one hand, if 60,000 George
W. Bush voters in Ohio had voted for Senator Kerry instead, we would be talking about the potential
reversal of the two Reagan and two Bush Administrations. On the other hand, Vice President Gore won
by at least 540,000 votes nationally, but President Bush won in 2004 by 3.5 million popular votes (and
President Clinton won by 8 million votes in 1996). See Mark Gersh, Battlefield Erosion, BLUEPRINT
MAG., Dec. 13, 2004, available at http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid127&subid900056&
contentid253080.
224. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
225. See particularly United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
226. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
227. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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